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Abstract 
 A taxpayer has the right to arrange his tax affairs within the 
constraints of the law to his best advantage to pay the least 
amount of tax. Coupled with this right is the taxpayer's right to 
certainty, which entails that the time of payment of taxes, the 
manner of payment, and the amount of payment must be clear 
and plain to the taxpayer and to any other person. Accordingly, a 
taxpayer must have peace of mind that revenue laws will not be 
amended arbitrarily, retrospectively, and with the effect that the 
taxpayer's position is affected negatively. The South African tax 
legislation allows the deferral of tax liability when amalgamation 
transactions, asset for share transactions, and mergers and 
acquisitions are embarked upon by a taxpayer. This article 
analyses the judgment in Pienaar v Commissioner: South African 
Revenue Services (87760/2014) [2017] ZAGPPHC 231 (29 May 
2017) critically with specific reference to amalgamation 
transactions, the taxpayer's right to tax certainty, and the 
application of retroactive amendments to completed transactions.  
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1 Introduction 
It is a well-known principle in taxation that a taxpayer has the right to arrange 
his tax affairs within the constraints of the law to his best advantage to pay 
the least amount of tax. Coupled with this right is the taxpayer's right to 
certainty, which entails that the time of payment of taxes, the manner of 
payment, and the amount of payment must be clear and plain to the 
taxpayer and to any other person.1 Accordingly, a taxpayer must have 
peace of mind that revenue laws will not be amended arbitrarily, 
retrospectively, and with the effect that the taxpayer's position is affected 
negatively. In contrast, SARS has the right to collect the maximum amount 
of tax which the law permits. The principle of efficiency requires the optimal 
collection and allocation of revenue to enhance policy objectives such as 
economic growth and increased production.2 The global financial crisis in 
2008, increased budget deficits, and slower than expected economic growth 
globally have caused revenue authorities to become more meticulous in 
their tax collection methods and quite aggressive in their enforcement of tax 
legislation.3  
South African tax legislation allows for the deferral of tax liability when 
amalgamation transactions, asset for share transactions, and mergers and 
acquisitions are embarked upon by a taxpayer.4 These corporate roll-over 
rules deviate from the normal rules that apply to the taxation of a distribution 
of profit from a company to its shareholders when specific transactions are 
embarked upon. The purpose of these rules is to grant tax relief when such 
                                            
1  LG Tredoux. BA LLB (US); LLM (UP); Advanced Cert in International Tax (UCT). 
Senior lecturer, Dept of Mercantile Law, UNISA. E-mail: classlg@unisa.ac.za. 
1  SP van Zyl. LLB (UP); LLM (UP); LLD (UNISA). Professor, Dept of Mercantile Law, 
University of South Africa; Visiting Professor, Gujarat National Law University. E-
mail: vzylsp@gmail.com. 
1  Smith Wealth of Nations 825-826. 
2  In an efficient tax system, the rules must not contribute to erosion via legal or illegal 
means, must not be overly reliant on one specific type of tax for revenue, and must 
have an objective basis for the levying of tax. There must be an identifiable 
transaction or reason for levying tax which can easily be ascertained, it must be 
enforceable and indeed be enforced with a reasonable penalty system and a low 
cost of collection. See Tanzi Public Finance 164; Krishna Fundamentals of Canadian 
Income Tax 11-12; Hogg, Magee and Li Principles of Canadian Income Tax 65; 
McGee and Yoon state that efficiency is enhanced when the most resources are left 
in the private sector and governments do not seek to maximise the amount of tax 
they can collect from the taxpayers. See McGee and Yoon "Enhancing Efficiency of 
Government Budget and Fiscal Policy" 52. 
3  SARS Strategic Plan 4-6; NPC National Development Plan 51-53. 
4  Sections 41-47 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962; De Koker, Koekemoer and 
Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 24; Stiglingh et al Silke South 
African Income Tax Vol I 507, 522.  
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mergers or complex corporate finance restructuring activities are 
undertaken.  
Section 44 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 is one example of a specific 
provision which grants tax relief to taxpayers who are involved in 
amalgamation transactions. In Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner 
for the South African Revenue Service5 the High Court was called upon to 
rule on the retro-activity of amendments to section 44 of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962. 
In this article we analyse this decision by explaining the background and 
rules that apply to the taxation of company distributions to indicate the 
context in which this dispute arose. This is followed by a discussion of the 
retroactivity of revenue laws, and concluding remarks. As this article 
examines two important aspects in tax law, namely the taxation of company 
distributions and the retroactivity of amendments to revenue laws, the 
importance and relevance of this discussion to the legal fraternity is obvious.  
2 The facts 
Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd ("Pienaar") is a duly registered company that was 
previously known as Serurubele Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd ("Serurubele"). 
Serurubele changed its name from Serurubele Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd to 
Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd on 7 August 2007.6 Both companies were 
involved in the business of supplying and distributing personal protective 
clothing. 
On 16 March 2007 the two companies, namely Serurubele and Pienaar, 
entered into an amalgamation transaction in terms of which all the assets of 
Pienaar were deemed to be acquired by Serurubele on 1 March 2007 as a 
going concern.7 A sale of business agreement was signed on 16 March 
2007, which was effective from 1 March 2007.8 As part of the consideration 
for this business, Serurubele issued shares to Pienaar at a value of the 
purchase price minus the liabilities which it assumed, referred to as the 
"equity consideration". From this equity consideration an amount equal to 
the par value of the shares was subtracted and the remaining amount was 
credited to the share premium account of Serurubele.9 On 1 April 2007 the 
                                            
5  Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
(87760/2014) [2017] ZAGPPHC 231 (29 May 2017) (hereafter the Pienaar case). 
6  Pienaar case para 7. 
7  Pienaar case para 7. 
8  Pienaar case para 7. 
9  Pienaar case para 2. 
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business was transferred to Serurubele and the purchase price paid by 
crediting the share premium account.  
The attorneys of Pienaar advised them to follow the above course of action 
as the most tax effective manner in which the amalgamation of the two 
companies and the inclusion of a BEE partner could be achieved. 
Accordingly, the transaction was based on commercial reasoning. 
At the time of this transaction, namely 16 March 2007, the tax consequences 
of this transaction were regulated in terms of section 44(9) of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962.10 For the amalgamation transaction to be completed, 
the old company had to be terminated. 
As part of the purchase price, Serurubele distributed the consideration 
shares to its shareholders in proportion to their respective shareholding. 
Serurubele was liquidated thereafter. On 3 May 2007 the directors of 
Serurubele - as it then was - decided to make a distribution of a total amount 
of R29 500 000 to the shareholders of the company in proportion to their 
respective shareholding, out of the share premium account of Serurubele. 
This distribution was completed on the same date. On 7 May 2007, as part 
of the BEE transaction, the existing shareholders of Pienaar sold 25.1 [per 
cent] of the issued share capital to a BEE partner, namely, Naha Properties 
(Pty) Ltd.11 
At the time of the decisions and payment of the distribution (3 May 2007), 
the proviso in paragraph (f) of the definition of a dividend in section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act12 excluded amounts that were distributed from the share 
premium account of a taxpayer. In addition, section 44(9) of the Income Tax 
Act, which applied at the time of the transactions, allowed for the tax-free 
distribution of shares in the course of an amalgamation transaction. The 
parties agreed that the distribution in question had not been a dividend as 
defined, and excluded this question from the ambit of the dispute between 
them.13 If this distribution had been a dividend as defined at the time it was 
made, the taxpayer would have been liable for Secondary Taxes on 
Companies ("STC") and it would have been liable to submit a STC return 
by 30 June 2007. 
                                            
10  Pienaar case para 6. 
11  Pienaar case para 7. 
12  Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
13  Pienaar case para 10. 
LG TREDOUX & SP VAN ZYL PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  5 
Several legislative amendments were in the process of finalisation during 
the time of the transactions entered into by Pienaar. In the budget speech 
of 21 February 2007 it was announced that section 44(9), which provided 
for the exemption from STC liability which is incurred in the course of 
amalgamation transactions (and the provision upon which the applicant had 
based its course of action during this amalgamation transaction), would be 
withdrawn.14 At this time the alternative provision that would apply in the 
place of section 44(9) was not clarified. On 27 February 2007 the Draft 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2007 was published, which proposed the 
repeal of section 44(9) and (10) of the Income Tax Act with retroactive effect 
from 21 February 2007. On 7 June 2007 the Taxation Laws Amendment 
Bill, 2007 was published in which the repeal of these paragraphs was no 
longer the only suggestion, but the insertion of a new section 44(9A) of the 
Income Tax Act was included. The new section 44(9A) deemed a 
distribution to be a dividend when the resultant company made a distribution 
after an amalgamation. On 8 August 2007 the Taxation Laws Amendment 
Act 8 of 2007 was promulgated. Specifically, paragraphs (9) and (10) of 
section 44 were repealed and replaced by section 44(9A) with retrospective 
effect from 21 February 2007.15 Section 44(9A) applied to any reduction or 
redemption of share capital or share premium of the resultant company, 
including the acquisition by a company of its own shares. It was common 
cause between the parties that this legislative amendment was promulgated 
after the amalgamation and distribution had been completed. 
On 6 December 2011 the commissioner launched an audit into Pienaar's 
tax affairs. On 13 December 2011 the commissioner issued an assessment 
for STC on Pienaar.16 In terms of this assessment, the commissioner 
claimed that the specific dividend cycle for STC purposes started on 23 
September 2005 and ended on 3 May 2007.17 The commissioner not only 
                                            
14  Pienaar case para 11. 
15  It is interesting to note that the facts as explained in the judgment indicate that 
paragraphs (9) and (10) of s 44 were repealed when s 44(9A) was enacted on 8 
August 2007. Upon closer investigation of this specific amendment, the authors 
noticed (in the explanatory notes after each section in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
which contains the cross references to the dates, detailed sections, as well as 
effective dates of applicable amendment acts) that s 44(9)(a) was substituted by 
other sections during 2011 and only eventually repealed by s 93(1)(1) of the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Act 31 of 2013 which was deemed to come into operation on 24 
October 2013. S 44(9)(b), which is still in force and was not amended or repealed at 
any stage, grants an exemption upon the disposal of shares acquired by a company 
as part of an amalgamation transaction and deems such a disposal not to be a 
dividend. In addition, s 44(9A) was inserted on 8 August 2007 with retrospective 
effect and repealed in 2010 as is explained in more detail later below. 
16  Pienaar case para 11. 
17  Pienaar case para 12. 
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assessed Pienaar on the amount of STC that he considered outstanding but 
he also levied interest from 1 July 2007 to 5 January 2012 (this is the date 
that the commissioner considered STC to be payable in terms of the 
assessment).18 Pienaar objected to this assessment without success. The 
dispute was referred for arbitration, which failed. Eventually, Pienaar 
approached the Gauteng North High Court for a declaratory order on the 
constitutionality of the retroactivity of the amendments.  
3 The judgment 
The question in dispute before the court was whether the distribution of the 
amount of R29 500 000 made on 3 May 2007 by Serurubele from its share 
premium account could be subject to STC based on the application of 
section 44(9A), which was a retrospective amendment of section 44(9) of 
the Income Tax Act 1962.19 Pienaar averred that the only reason for the 
assessment by SARS on this distribution was due to the retrospective 
changes to the act which enabled SARS to apply section 44(9A) to this 
distribution.20 As a result, Pienaar sought to have the assessment of SARS 
dated 13 December 2011 declared invalid, and requested the court to set it 
aside. After an in-depth analysis of the question of retrospective legislative 
amendments and the constitutional aspects of such an amendment, the 
court dismissed the application of Pienaar and made no order as to costs.21 
4 Commentary: Background, STC, and dividends tax 
A distribution of after tax profits earned by a company is usually paid as a 
dividend to the shareholders of a company or it can also be paid as a return 
of capital, which is sourced from a capital account of the company.22 In order 
for STC or dividends tax to be payable, a payment must comply with the 
definition of a dividend as it applied at the time of the transaction. 
Prior to 1 April 2012 all dividends declared by South African companies were 
subject to secondary tax on companies, which was a company-level tax 
payable by the company when a dividend was declared and prior to the 
distribution of the dividend to its shareholders.23 The amount of the liability 
for STC was calculated by subtracting the amount of the dividends that had 
                                            
18  Pienaar case para 12. 
19  Pienaar case para 7. 
20  Pienaar case para 14. 
21  Pienaar case para 113. 
22  Croome Tax Law 402; Van der Linde 2009 TSAR 484-487.  
23  Mazansky 2003 BIFD 145; Van Blerck 2003 BIFD 570-571; Van Blerck 1993 BIFD 
701-703.  
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accrued to a company from the amount of the dividends which that company 
declared within a certain dividend cycle (time period). Besides the lengthy 
and complex legislative provisions, the difficult terminology and the 
complicated definition of a dividend, the payment of STC often resulted in a 
reduction of the accounting profits of the company, which placed a South 
African company at a disadvantage when compared to foreign companies. 
This could affect the neutrality of investment decisions by foreign investors 
and deter investment in South African companies.24  
In the context of cross-border trade, the application of certain articles of 
double-tax treaties (or a double tax agreement - "DTA") in transactions 
which involved STC became problematic. This sometimes resulted in 
double taxation or non-taxation. This was because STC was unique to 
South Africa. Furthermore, the differences between taxes levied in other 
states (that were party to such agreements) and STC was too significant. 
This made it very difficult to reconcile STC with such taxes or to determine 
the allocation of tax liability in terms of the articles of such double tax 
agreements.25 In Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd v CSARS,26 the court 
denied the claiming of a refund in respect of a deemed dividend based on a 
provision in the tax treaty between South Africa and Germany which 
contained a lower rate of tax for dividends.27 The court stated that the 
structure of STC did not correspond with the taxes mentioned in the treaty 
as it was irreconcilable with the definition of a dividend as contained in this 
specific treaty.28 The differences that caused problems in the attempts to 
reconcile STC with its foreign counterparts were mostly caused by the 
difference in the tax base. STC was a tax on the difference in dividends of 
a company which declared the distribution, as opposed to dividend tax, 
which was levied on the recipient of the dividend or the shareholder.29 The 
wording in the article of this specific DTA granted relief to the recipient of 
                                            
24  SARS Explanatory Memorandum 2008 24; Hattingh 2009 BIT 442; Stiglingh et al 
Silke South African Income Tax Vol I 562; SARS Quick Guide to Dividends Tax 1; 
Oguttu 2011 SAYIL 77. For further reading on STC see Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on 
Income Tax paras 17.40-17.51. 
25  SARS Explanatory Memorandum 2008 24. 
26  Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 70 SATC 195 2008 (T) (hereafter the 
Volkswagen case) 
27  Volkswagen case 199D. 
28  Volkswagen case 204A-C. See also Editorial Comment 2008 International Tax Law 
Reports 772; Hattingh 2009 BIT 446. 
29  Volkswagen case 203C, 293G; Editorial Comment 2008 International Tax Law 
Reports 772; Hattingh 2009 BIT 445; SARS Explanatory Memorandum 2008 31. 
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the dividend and not the company declaring the dividend. In the main, this 
is why the court denied the relief in favour of the company.30  
Before a transaction could be subject to STC it had to comply with the 
definition of a dividend. For the purposes of this analysis it is not necessary 
to quote the lengthy definition again save to mention that the transaction in 
the Pienaar-case did not comply with the definition of a dividend. This is so 
because the amount in question had been transferred from the share 
premium account of the company. As mentioned above, paragraph (f) of the 
definition of a dividend specifically excluded distributions from a share 
premium account from the ambit of the definition of a dividend. Thus, based 
on normal principles, this transaction could not, for STC purposes be 
taxable in the hands of Pienaar. This was common cause between the 
parties.  
It is not unusual to exclude amounts paid from a capital account from the 
definition of a dividend. However, the rules differ depending on the 
jurisdiction concerned. In Australia, for example, amounts paid from or 
debited against a company's share capital account are expressly excluded 
from the definition of a dividend and excluded from the Australian dividends 
tax regime and dividend imputation system.31 In contrast with the South 
African and Australian position, the Canadian definition of a dividend does 
not contain specific exclusions from the definition of a dividend in its tax 
legislation.32 The Canadian Income Tax Act 1985, however, defines the 
term "taxable dividend" in a manner which excludes a capital dividend, 
which is treated as exempt in terms of section 83(2) of the Income Tax Act 
1985. The Act contains a separate regime for the taxation of capital 
dividends.33  
It was announced in the 2007 Budget Speech that the STC provisions in the 
Income Tax Act would be amended and a dividends tax system enacted to 
align the South African tax on dividends with international trends. This was 
so as to attract more foreign direct investment to South Africa.34 The 
                                            
30  Volkswagen case 204D-F; Editorial Comment 2008 International Tax Law Reports 
772. 
31  Section 6(1) definition of the term "dividend" part (d) read with s 6(4) of the Australian 
Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936; Deutsch et al Australian Tax Handbook 815. 
32  Friedlander Taxation of Corporate Finance para 5.1.1.1; Duff and Loomer Taxation 
of Business Organizations 233, 609; Loomer "Canada" 473; s 248(1) of the 
Canadian Income Tax Act, 1985, definition of "dividend"; CCH Canadian Master Tax 
Guide 569, 575; Tobias Taxation of Corporations, Partnerships and Trusts 210. 
33  Section 89(1) of the Canadian Income Tax Act, 1985; Duff and Loomer Taxation of 
Business Organizations 233. 
34  SARS Explanatory Memorandum 2008 24; Hattingh 2009 BIT 442. 
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necessary amendments were drafted and eventually came into force on 1 
April 2012 after many amendments of the initial proposed legislation. From 
this date, the distribution of a dividend paid by a South African resident 
company has been subject to dividend withholding tax, currently levied at a 
rate of twenty per cent, for which the beneficial owner is liable.35  
It is rather peculiar that the commissioner, in the Pienaar case, sought to 
enforce a tax which he knew would be phased out literally a few months 
prior to the demise of STC (the assessment was dated 13 December 2011, 
while STC was gradually repealed from 1 April 2012). The transaction 
clearly did not fall within the ambit of the definition of dividend. The fact that 
certain capital transfers were excluded from the definition of “dividend” did 
not mean that those distributions would not be taxable at all. The capital 
gains tax ("CGT") provisions may still have found application. 
Throughout the proposed amendments to the dividends tax provisions, the 
exclusion of amounts paid from certain capital accounts from the definition 
of a dividend was retained.36 This approach is similar to the position under 
Australian tax law, which excludes amounts distributed from share capital 
from the definition of a dividend. If it had at any time been the intention of 
the legislature to tax distributions from capital accounts, this would surely 
have been included in the legislative amendments which were drafted prior 
to the time of the Pienaar assessment.  
At the time of the proposed changes to the dividends tax regime in the 
Income Tax Act, the Companies Act37 was also promulgated. This Act 
abolished the requirement that it was compulsory for all companies to keep 
record of their share capital and share premium accounts.38 The removal of 
the requirement to keep a record of the capital in those accounts could have 
had disastrous consequences for income tax calculation purposes had it not 
been for the introduction of the concept of contributed tax capital into the 
Income Tax Act. 
                                            
35  Clegg and Stretch Income Tax para 12.17.1; Stiglingh et al Silke South African 
Income Tax Vol I 562; SARS Budget Tax Guide 18; SARS Quick Guide to Dividends 
Tax 2; De Koker, Koekemoer and Williams Silke on South African Income Tax para 
9.37; Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 2013 397. 
36  See the definition of "dividend" in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 1962, which excludes 
payments sourced from contributed tax capital from the dividend definition. 
37  Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
38  Sections 76 and 77 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 contained the requirements for 
the stated capital and share premiums accounts, while the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, which came into effect on 1 May 2011, contains no such requirements. 
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5 Commentary: Share premium, share capital, and 
contributed tax capital 
The concept contributed tax capital was introduced in the Income Tax Act 
to ensure that all companies keep a separate account of their "contributed 
tax capital" ("CTC") in their accounting records in accordance with the 
requirements of this definition in section 1 of the Income Tax Act.39 In this 
separate account the notional amount (as it was on 11 January 2011),40 
which reflects the value of the contributions received by the company from 
its shareholders for the issue of shares, is recorded separately per share 
per class. The value of the total share capital (excluding amounts that 
constitute dividends or other distributions to shareholders) of the specific 
company should be reflected in this account, as well as the value of the 
amounts that were contributed to the company after this date in exchange 
for the issue of shares.41 This definition was amended several times before 
the eventual implementation of the new dividends tax. The same 
amendment act also inserted the new definition of a dividend, the new 
dividends tax regime, and transitional arrangements for the phasing out of 
STC with the effective date 1 April 2012.42 The balance reflected in the CTC 
account should reflect all the previous share capital account, share premium 
account, and stated capital account balances, and the values contained in 
this account may be used for future capital gains tax calculations to 
determine the tax liability of the company or shareholder, where 
applicable.43  
As was confirmed in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Bobat,44 payments 
from a share premium or share capital account were mostly not subject to 
STC. In this case, a payment was made by a company from the share 
premium account to its shareholders as part of the restructuring of the 
company and a reduction of capital. As the payment did not constitute a 
dividend as defined, the court found this payment to be exempt from tax 
                                            
39  Stiglingh et al Silke South African Income Tax Vol I 554. 
40  The starting CTC. 
41  Section 1 of the Income Tax Act definition of "contributed tax capital"; Stiglingh et al 
Silke South African Income Tax Vol I 554-555; SARS Explanatory Memorandum 
2008 24; s 4(1)(b) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008 inserted the 
new definition of CTC into s 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
42  Louw 2011 Moneyweb's Tax Breaks 7-8. For more detail on CTC see Anon 2009 
Taxgram 3. Also see s 1 of the Income Tax Act definition of "contributed tax capital"; 
Stiglingh et al Silke South African Income Tax Vol I 558; Clegg and Stretch Income 
Tax para 12.2.2. 
43  Stiglingh et al Silke South African Income Tax Vol I 554-555. 
44  Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Bobat 2005 67 SATC 47 (NPD) (hereafter the 
Bobat case). 
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(this was prior to the introduction of CTC).45 Interestingly, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal gave a contrary judgment in the case of Liberty Investors 
Ltd (in members voluntary liquidation) v Commissioner South African 
Revenue Services.46 In this matter, amounts were received from a 
subsidiary as dividends by a holding company, which were revenue in 
nature and capitalised in the accounting records of the company by adding 
these amounts to the share capital and share premium accounts of the 
company.47 After the holding company was placed into liquidation, it 
declared a dividend which the commissioner sought to assess as dividends 
upon which STC would be payable. The company objected, claiming that 
the distributions were capital in nature and as part of the liquidation process 
had been exempt.48 At the time, section 64B(5)(c) of the Income Tax Act 
1962 provided that dividends paid in the course of liquidation that were of a 
capital nature were exempt from STC if paid in the course of the liquidation 
of the company.49 Both the court a quo and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
found that dividends were inherently income in nature, and that the manner 
in which the amounts were reflected in the accounting records of the 
company did not alter the nature of the payments, which originally had been 
dividends.50  
Although the law which regulates distributions paid from capital accounts 
has been amended in many ways recently, and specific principles apply to 
liquidation distributions, the principle has remained the same, namely that 
distributions made out of a capital account (whether paid from the previous 
share capital account or the share premium account or the current 
contributed tax capital account) of the company is usually not subject to STC 
or dividends tax.51 The Bobat case in our view represents a correct 
interpretation of the law in this regard.  
It does not appear to have been the intention of the legislature to regard 
returns paid from either share premium or share capital accounts (both of 
which were included in the definition of the concept contributed tax capital) 
                                            
45  Bobat case 49. 
46  Liberty Investors Ltd (in members voluntary liquidation) v Commissioner South 
African Revenue Services 2005 2 SA 313 (SCA) (hereafter the Liberty Investors 
case) 
47  Liberty Investors case 314G-H. 
48  Liberty Investors case 314G-H 
49  Liberty Investors case 314I-J. 
50  Liberty Investors case 315E-316E. 
51  See para (f) of the previous definition of "dividend"; Stiglingh et al Silke South African 
Income Tax Vol I 554-558. Also see the current definition of "dividend" in s 1 of the 
Income Tax Act, which specifically excludes amounts paid from contributed tax 
capital from the definition of a dividend. 
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as taxable for the purposes of STC or dividend tax. This is evident from the 
retention of the exclusion from the definition of a dividend of payments made 
from the contributed tax capital account as the law currently stands. This is 
also what the law stated in respect of share premium accounts at the time 
of the amalgamation transactions, assessment, and averred dividend cycle, 
the completion of the distribution, and the hearing of the Pienaar case. The 
amounts in dispute in this matter were therefore a payment from the share 
premium account and thus not taxable as a dividend to which STC could 
apply at any relevant point in time. It seems very clear that were it not for 
the insertion of section 44(9A) and the retroactive effect of the amendment, 
this transaction would not be subject to STC. This was also argued by 
Pienaar.52  
It is further rather strange that a deemed dividend provision was inserted in 
the part of the Income Tax Act which regulates corporate roll-over relief, and 
not in the section dealing with deemed dividends. Rules of interpretation 
require that a provision be interpreted by attempting to determine the 
intention of the legislature in a manner consistent with the purpose and 
context of a provision within the context of the place where that provision is 
located in the Act itself, without allowing for the fragmentation of the 
legislation as a whole.53 This was further confirmed in Standard General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Commissioner for Customs and Excise,54 where the 
court stated that words should be given the meaning which "takes its colour, 
like a chameleon, from its setting and surrounds in the Act".55  
Although the interpretation of section 44(9A) was not in dispute in this 
matter, it is our view that this section did not fit into the scheme of the Act at 
the setting and surrounds where it was placed. The entire part deals with 
relief from tax liability during amalgamation transactions. As the normal 
rules that apply to all company distributions could be applied to such a 
transaction, it is our view that it is not proper to insert deemed dividend 
provisions in this part of the Act. This odd placing of the amendment 
supports the argument that the amendment was drafted, promulgated, and 
implemented in haste to recover alleged lost taxes.  
                                            
52  Pienaar case para 109. 
53  Legwaila and Ngwenya 2013 De Jure 1069-1072; CSARS v Airworld CC 2008 3 SA 
335 (A) 345I-J. Also see Glen Anil Development v SIR 1975 4 SA 715 (A) 727; CIR 
v Delfos 1933 AD 242.  
54  Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Commissioner for Customs and Excise 2005 
2 SA 166 (SCA) (hereafter the Standard General Insurance case). 
55  Standard General Insurance case 174H-175A. 
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An additional strange occurrence was the repeal of this section with 
effective date 1 January 2011 within such a relatively short period of time 
after its insertion on 8 August 2007, which was effective from 21 February 
2007.56 This section literally applied to a select few transactions. It is of 
concern that the very section upon which the commissioner relied in this 
matter was repealed on 1 January 2011 prior to the assessment of 
Pienaar.57 This creates the unfortunate impression that a mere hunt for 
money was embarked upon by SARS and National Treasury through this 
absurd amendment.  
Section 44(9), which was in force at the time of the distribution of the amount 
from the share premium account to the shareholder, exempted the 
distribution of shares as part of an amalgamation transaction to the 
shareholders of the amalgamated company.58 The law as it applied during 
the 2007 year of assessment also specifically excluded from the definition 
of a dividend the value of any asset given to a shareholder to the extent that 
such an asset constituted a reduction of the share premium account of a 
company.59 The parties agreed that the combined effect of the application 
of these provisions to the facts in the Pienaar case, as it then was, would 
have the result that this distribution of shares would not be subject to STC.  
The only reason for the possible application of STC to the transaction was 
therefore that the provisions of section 44(9A) caught it within the deeming 
provision. Although the parties were in agreement that the provisions of 
section 44(9) applied to the distribution, this view is not necessarily shared. 
Section 44(9) granted exemption from tax for shares that were distributed 
during the amalgamation transaction, while the amount which formed the 
subject of the dispute in the Pienaar case was described in the law report 
as "an amount" of R29 500 000 which was paid from the share premium 
account. It would have been interesting to see how the court would have 
interpreted section 44(9) if it had been placed before the court for 
adjudication. As the amount in question did not constitute shares, it does 
not necessarily follow that this section formed the basis of arguing that the 
transaction would have been tax exempt had it not been for the 
retrospective insertion of section 44(9A). It is conceded that the court could 
not interpret an issue which was not raised before it as the parties did not 
                                            
56  Section 44(9A) was deleted by s 63(1)(b) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 
2010 with effect from 1 January 2011.  
57  Pienaar was issued with an assessment on 13 December 2011. 
58  Huxham and Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 2007 250. 
59  Paragraph (f) of the definition of a dividend in s 1 of the Income Tax Act; Huxham 
and Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 2007 266. 
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require judicial interpretation of this section in their application or in the 
opposition to the application.  
A further factual difference between the protection or relief provided for and 
the transaction in dispute is the timing of the distribution. Section 44(9) 
provides relief for transactions that are part of amalgamation transactions. 
This was not what occurred on the facts of the Pienaar case. The distribution 
in casu was made after the amalgamation had been completed and, in our 
view, rendered the application of the corporate roll over relief rules 
irrelevant.  
If the exclusion of a distribution paid from the share premium account from 
the dividend definition prohibits the taxation of the return as a dividend for 
the purposes of STC, the question remains how such a return should have 
been assessed in the absence of section 44(9A).  
6 Commentary: Capital gains tax 
A return of capital is not necessarily without tax consequences. Capital 
gains tax rules may apply to certain company distributions.60  
Before capital gains tax was introduced in 2001, a return of capital (which 
at the time was a reduction of the share premium account of the company) 
was considered a tax-free return in the hands of the shareholder. This was 
subject to the condition that such a shareholder held the shares as a capital 
asset and did not speculate or trade in shares. It was a popular trend for 
companies to make a distribution of capital to their shareholders and by 
doing so avoid STC. This type of distribution resulted in a reduction of the 
total tax liability of the company, while shareholders, depending on the 
circumstances, received a tax-free capital distribution.61 
The Income Tax Act contains specific rules that are applicable when a 
company distributes cash or assets of a capital nature that are linked to 
shares.62 These rules are contained in part XI of the 8th Schedule to the 
Income Tax Act and apply to both cash dividends and dividends in specie 
that are capital in nature.63 Paragraphs 75 and 76 of the 8th Schedule to the 
                                            
60  Stiglingh et al Silke: South African Income Tax Vol II 858. 
61  Mazansky 2012 BIT 172. Also see Williams CGT - A Practitioner's Manual 229-239 
for the rules that applied historically when CGT was introduced for the first time in 
2001. 
62  Stiglingh et al Silke: South African Income Tax Vol II 950. 
63  Williams CGT - A Practitioner's Manual 229-239; Stiglingh et al Silke: South African 
Income Tax Vol II 950. 
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Income Tax Act contain rules that apply to dividends in specie and returns 
of capital as defined. However, the remainder of the possible capital 
distributions which do not comply with the specific requirements and 
definitions, and could be made by a company to its shareholders, are 
taxable under the general principles that apply to the taxation of capital 
gains. CGT is mostly levied upon the realisation of CGT assets. That said, 
certain exceptions to this general rule are contained in the deemed capital 
gain provisions and the specific rules that were enacted that apply to 
company distributions. A distribution of an asset by a company to a holder 
of shares is also specifically included in the list of disposal events listed in 
the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act, to which the general CGT rules 
apply.64 
It is our view that the distribution in casu would at the time have amounted 
to a "capital distribution", which was defined in paragraph 74 of the 8th 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act 1962 as "any distribution (or part thereof) 
by a company that (a) does not constitute a dividend" or is an exempt 
dividend in terms of section 65B(5(c) of the Income Tax Act as it then 
applied.65 The distribution in casu did not constitute a dividend as defined 
as was explained above, and the law as it applied in 2007 when the 
transaction took place included this definition of a capital distribution.66 The 
definition of the term “distribution” included cash or assets in specie that 
were transferred to a shareholder.67 
Under the normal CGT rules that applied at the time of the transaction, if a 
company distributed an asset to a shareholder, which was not subject to 
STC, the shareholder would treat this receipt as proceeds for CGT purposes 
due to the application of paragraphs 74, 75 and 76 of the 8th Schedule to 
the Income Tax Act.68 Paragraph 76 (as it applied during 2007) stated that 
if a capital distribution of cash or an asset in specie had accrued to a 
shareholder, and it happened before the valuation date (1 October 2001), 
the base cost (referred to as allowable expenditure) would have to be 
                                            
64  Paragraph 11(1)(e) of the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act; Stiglingh et al Silke: 
South African Income Tax Vol II 868. 
65  Paragraph 74 of the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act definition of "capital 
distribution", as it applied in 2007 prior to its deletion by s 117(1)(a) of the Taxation 
Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2011 with effect from 1 April 2012. Also see Meyerowitz 
Meyerowitz on Income Tax para 17A.26. 
66  Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax para 39.11.2. 
67  Paragraph 74 of the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act definition of "distribution", 
as it applied in 2007 prior to its deletion by s 117(1)(a) of the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act 24 of 2011 with effect from 1 April 2012.  
68  Also see Huxham and Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 2007 685. 
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reduced by the amount of the distribution.69 This could ultimately result in a 
larger capital gain in certain cases, depending on the other aspects that are 
taken into account for the purposes of the calculation. If the capital 
distributions took place after the valuation date , the shareholder must 
include the proceeds of the share upon the eventual disposal of the share 
in the amount of the capital distribution so received and reduce the base 
cost by the amount of the distributions.70  
According to the judgment the distribution would have been treated as a 
part disposal of a share for CGT purposes.71 As the legislation which applied 
to company distributions was amended several times during this time, this 
interpretation would depend on the specific version of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962 which was applied at a specific time. The exact definitions which 
the court considered applicable in this case were not analysed in the 
judgment, as the merits were not a question before the court.  
The implications of these provisions for the Pienaar case would be that 
deferral of a tax liability would have been allowed until the shares were 
disposed of. A value determination had to be done at the time of distribution 
to determine the amount to be added to the proceeds of the shares for such 
a future disposal. This would result in a lesser amount of tax payable at the 
time of distribution, yet a potentially larger capital gain upon the disposal of 
the shares. This may be an undesirable consequence for the commissioner 
in this instance perhaps, but it did not constitute a permanent escape or 
erosion of the tax base in respect of the shares that would eventually be 
disposed of. For the purposes of CGT, the collection of the full amount of 
tax is postponed until disposal. However, the application of section 44(9A) 
prevented the normal tax consequences from applying and deemed the 
distribution to be profit which was not of a capital nature. Disappointingly, 
the court explained the law relating to CGT in brief, but did not address the 
arguments of the applicant in this regard.72 It remains our view that upon a 
proper interpretation of the facts in the absence of the retroactivity of section 
44(9A), CGT would have been the appropriate tax to levy. 
                                            
69  Paragraph 76 of the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act as it applied in 2007 prior to 
the amendment thereof. Also see Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax para 
39.11.2. 
70  Paragraph 76 of the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax Act as it applied in 2007 prior to 
the amendment thereof. Also see Huxham and Haupt Notes on South African 
Income Tax 2007 685, 689. 
71  Pienaar case para 23. 
72  Pienaar case para 23. 
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7 The application of a general anti-avoidance provision 
It is stated in the Pienaar judgment that it had come to the government's 
attention that certain stakeholders were engaging in tax avoidance 
transactions by using section 44(9) of the Income Tax Act and that the 
insertion of section 44(9A) was necessary to cure a problem.73 That said, it 
was common cause between the parties that the transactions in question 
had a commercial rationale.74 The insertion of section 44(9A) can be 
classified as a specific anti-avoidance provision to target specific 
transactions. In casu, the commissioner did not rely on the general anti 
avoidance provisions (GAAR) as set out in section 80A-L of the Income Tax 
Act to attack the transactions. This is despite the general statement that 
taxpayers were abusing section 44(9) to enter into tax avoidance schemes.  
For the commissioner to rely on a GAAR successfully, it is required that 
there must be an arrangement in terms of which the sole or main purpose 
is to obtain a tax benefit and the transaction must ultimately result in such a 
tax benefit. An arrangement is defined to include a transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement, enforceable and unenforceable understanding, or any 
such listed arrangements, which include the alienation of property.75 
Furthermore, any steps taken in order to execute an arrangement as alluded 
to in section 80L are deemed included as an arrangement so defined.76 The 
definition of a tax benefit includes "the avoidance, postponement, or 
reduction of any liability for tax".77 In this sense, "tax" refers to any tax, duty 
or levy which is levied in terms of the Income Tax Act 1962 or any other Act 
which is administered by the commissioner.78 As CGT could have been 
levied in the absence of the deeming provision in section 44(9A) (see 
discussion above), it would be difficult for the commissioner to prove that 
there had been a reduction of tax. However, it can be argued that the tax 
liability under CGT is significantly lower than the tax liability for STC. 
Accordingly, a reduction in tax occurred.  
                                            
73  Pienaar case para 99. 
74  Pienaar case para 7.4. 
75  Section 80L of the Income Tax Act, definition of "arrangement". Also see Stiglingh et 
al Silke: South African Income Tax Vol II 799; Oguttu International Tax Law 110-113. 
76  Section 80H of the Income Tax Act read with s 80L of the Income Tax Act, definition 
of "arrangement". 
77  Section 1 of the Income Tax Act definition of "tax benefit". This definition now applies 
to all sections in the entire Income Tax Act and was repealed from the definitions 
which applied only to the GAAR contained in s 80L of the Income Tax Act by the 
promulgation of s 77 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 7 of 2010. 
78  Section 80L of the Income Tax Act definition of "tax"; Stiglingh et al Silke: South 
African Income Tax Vol II 799; Oguttu International Tax Law 113. 
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Where a tax avoidance arrangement is made in the context of business, it 
must either lack commercial substance, or make use of means that are not 
normally utilised, or create rights or obligations which are not normally 
created, or result in a misuse or abuse79 of the provisions of the Income Tax 
Act.80 It is clear in the Pienaar case that the transactions were carried out in 
the ordinary course of business, and there appears to have been no misuse 
of the Act. In addition, on the facts nothing indicates that Pienaar took any 
steps or means that are not normally utilised, or that the transactions lack 
commercial substance.  
When the requirements of section 80A are met, the commissioner may 
disregard the arrangement itself or steps or parts of the arrangement for tax 
purposes and he may determine the tax consequences of the transaction in 
a manner which he deems fit to decrease the effect of the said tax benefit.81  
The courts have interpreted some of the core concepts, although with 
reference to a previous version of the GAAR. In CIR v Conhage (Pty) 
Limited82 a scheme was devised to arrange for the tax-free return of capital 
profit at a time when CGT was not yet applicable in South Africa. The court 
                                            
79  The phrase "misuse or abuse of the act" is not defined in the Income Tax Act and it 
is unclear how the courts will interpret these provisions. The Canadian court has 
stated that if a taxpayer takes advantage of the express wording of the act which 
differs from the effect of a transaction this constitutes misuse of the act (see 
McNichol v Canada 1997 2 CTC 2088 97 DTC 111 TCC; Duff and Loomer Taxation 
of Business Organizations 644-658, 673; Bleiwas, Hutson and Kellough Taxation of 
Private Corporations paras 19.92-16. Also see RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc et al 
v The Queen 1997 TCJ No 302, 1998 1 CTC 2300, 97 DTC 302 (TCC), where the 
court found that the Income Tax Act, 1985 prevents surplus stripping and that if the 
taxpayer is in contravention of the general purpose of the act to prevent such surplus 
stripping, the actions of the taxpayers amounted to a misuse of the act. In Canada a 
contextual purposive interpretation of the act itself is required to determine whether 
a scheme applicable to corporate distributions applied. In this regard see Collins & 
Aikman Products Co v Canada 2009 TCJ No 225, 2009 TCC 299, 2009 DTC 1179 
(TCC) aff'd 2010 FCJ No 1232, 2011 1 CTC 250, 2010 DTC 5164 (FCA)). 
80  Section 80A(a)(i)(ii) read with ss 80A(c)(i)-(ii) of the Income Tax Act. The phrase 
"means that are not normally utilised" refers to rights and obligations that would 
normally not be created between people dealing at arm's length. The meaning of the 
phrase "in the context of business" refers to transactions or arrangements which are 
carried out in the normal course of business and only one of these four requirements 
needs to be met for a transaction in the normal course of business to be considered 
an avoidance arrangement. Also see Oguttu International Tax Law 115-119, 120-
122; Stiglingh et al Silke: South African Income Tax Vol II 799-800. For a detailed 
comparative analysis of the misuse and abuse provisions, see Kujinga 2012 CILSA 
42-63, where he warns that the purposive interpretation and the approach of Canada 
is not necessarily appropriate for South Africa to follow. Also see Cilliers 2008 Part 
One The Taxpayer 85-92; Cilliers 2008 Part Two The Taxpayer 103-110. 
81  Section 80B(1)(a)-(e) of the Income Tax Act. Also see Stiglingh et al Silke: South 
African Income Tax Vol II 803-804. 
82  CIR v Conhage (Pty) Limited 1999 4 SA 1149 (SCA) (hereafter the Conhage case). 
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held that the sole or main purpose of this transaction had not been tax 
avoidance but to raise additional funds to expand the taxpayer's business 
and that the taxpayer had no motivation to reduce its tax burden.83 
Mazansky points out that this case weakened the GAAR significantly as the 
court failed to apply the GAAR to a part or step of a complex series of 
transactions in this matter and was satisfied that the overall purpose of the 
transaction as a whole had to be one which was motivated by a commercial 
purpose, and not tax reasons.84 It seems that the approach of the courts are 
that tax saving is permissible, but where a transaction had been entered into 
blatantly for tax avoidance purposes the courts would most likely find in 
favour of SARS.85 In the Pienaar case there was no evidence of a blatant 
tax avoidance purpose. As was confirmed in the Bobat case, not only must 
there be this tax avoidance purpose, but the sole or only purpose of an 
arrangement must be to obtain a tax benefit.86 In this matter, an 
arrangement which had a dual purpose, namely the reduction of capital 
which was done as part of the restructuring of a company and also had the 
reduction of estate duty was found not to be subject to the GAAR, because 
the sole purpose of the transaction had not been to avoid estate duty.87 As 
a result of the lack of judgments, it is not certain how section 80A-L of the 
Income Tax Act will be applied. Some jurists are of the opinion that the 
unfamiliar concepts in the GAAR will take decades to be properly applied 
and defined by the courts.88 The overall guideline seems to be that as long 
as the transactions are executed within the confines of normal commercial 
arrangements no further investigation to determine the sole or main purpose 
of the arrangement is required.89 The nature of the purpose requirement 
seems to have remained unchanged after the introduction of the new 
GAAR.90 The facts in Pienaar indicate that the intention of the taxpayer was 
to amalgamate two companies, enhance the BEE status of the business, 
and continue with its operations while making a return of capital to its 
shareholders. The sole reason for the distribution and other transactions 
was not to avoid or postpone tax liability. Considering the uncertainty of how 
the courts will interpret the new GAAR, it is not surprising that the 
commissioner did not attempt to rely on section 80A in the Pienaar case. As 
                                            
83  Conhage case 1155I-1156C. 
84  Mazansky 2007 BIT 160. 
85  Mazansky 2007 BIT 159-162. 
86  It must be noted that this judgment was based on an earlier version of the GAAR 
contained in s 103 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
87  Bobat case 52G-53G, 59D. 
88  Mazansky 2007 BIT 163; Cassidy 2012 Stell LR 351. 
89  Mazansky 2007 BIT 163. 
90  Kujinga 2014 CILSA 458-459. 
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it is clear that the transaction had a commercial rationale and was not 
entered into with the sole or main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, any 
reliance on the GAAR would thus in all probability have failed.  
8 Commentary: The retro-activity of amendments, the 
taxpayer's rights, and the Constitution  
It is a well-established principle in international tax law that a taxpayer has 
a legal right to reduce the amount of what would constitute his taxes, or 
altogether avoid them, by any means within the ambit of the law.91 Where a 
transaction was concluded for the purposes of business efficacy, the 
associated desire to structure the transaction to reduce a tax liability or to 
escape it altogether is irrelevant.92 In Duke of Westminster v IRC93 Lord 
Tomlin aptly remarked that "Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his 
affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it 
otherwise would be." As pointed out above, the difference between a 
legitimate arrangement to reduce taxes and an impermissible scheme of tax 
avoidance is a fine line. In casu Pienaar structured the amalgamation 
transaction within the legal parameters of the Income Tax Act as it applied 
when the transactions were entered into so as to obtain the best commercial 
structure to include a BEE partner. As pointed out above, the absence of 
any intention to deliberately avoid paying taxes clearly indicates the 
commercial soundness of the transaction. There is no doubt that the 
amalgamation transaction falls within the parameters of a legal transaction 
structured to the best tax advantage as envisaged by Lord Tomlin in Duke 
of Westminster v IRC.94  
The taxpayer's right to arrange his affairs to arrive at the best tax advantage 
is interconnected with the taxpayer's right to certainty. Adam Smith 
advocates that every taxpayer has the right to certainty as to the taxes 
payable by him and that the taxes due are not arbitrarily determined.95 This 
translates into the statement that the time of tax, the method of tax, and the 
                                            
91  Gregory v Helvering 293 US 465 (1935); Jones v Helvering 71 F 2d 214 (1934). 
92  Superior Oil Co v State of Mississippi 280 US 390 (1930). 
93  Duke of Westminster v IRC 1936 19 TC 490; Also see Gibson 2017 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Corporate-Tax/South-
Africa/Cliffe-Dekker-Hofmeyr/BEPS-effect-has-Lord-Tomlins-famous-dictum-
become-
obsolete?utm_source=ILO+Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Newslet
ter+2017-10-20&utm_campaign=Corporate+Tax+Newsletter; Mazansky 2005 BIFD 
116-120; Tooma Legislating against Tax Avoidance 214-215. 
94  Also see Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services & Ritchie v CIR 1929 14 TC 754. 
95  Smith Wealth of Nations 426. Also see Von Justi Natur und Wesen 250, where he 
notes that the taxpayer's tax liability must be transparently clear to everyone. 
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amount of tax must be certain to the taxpayer and to every other person.96 
This certainty involves that the taxation laws must be clear and 
unambiguous as to the taxpayer's tax liability.97 Furthermore, the taxpayer 
must have peace of mind that the tax laws will not be amended arbitrarily, 
or retrospectively, and with the effect that the taxpayer's tax or economic 
position is affected negatively.98 Accordingly, the taxpayer may enter into 
transactions within the parameters of the law to arrive at the best tax 
advantage with the comfort and confidence that the tax position will not be 
altered negatively by an amendment with retrospective effect.99 This right 
entails that the taxpayer can either arrange his affairs to circumvent the 
statutory provisions or to bring them within the ambit of the statutory 
provisions in order to obtain a tax benefit.100 In the Pienaar case the 
taxpayer arranged the transactions within the ambit of the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act. This right, however, does not entail that where a lacuna in 
law exists that leads to base erosion, no amendments may be promulgated. 
Furthermore, the right does not prevent the retro-activity of amendments 
altogether. Apart from criminal law, there is no rule in the South African law 
that prevents the legislator from promulgating legislation with retroactive 
application. The legislator may still – and has a legal duty to – amend 
existing legislation so as to protect the tax base. That said, amendments 
may not be structured with retrospective effect to target specific transactions 
in order to collect lost taxes.101 This is so because the legislator cannot 
create a tax with retrospective effect to tax completed transactions.102 It is 
important to note that rapid and frequent changes to revenue laws result in 
a lack of tax certainty.103 Backhaus and Wagner correctly point out that 
modern states fail to follow Smith's canons of taxation; instead, they resort 
to extreme measures to take revenue from any possible source.104 This 
behaviour is clearly evident from the repeal of section 44(9) and the insertion 
of section 44(9A) with retrospective effect. Interestingly, section 44(9A) was 
repealed with effect from 1 January 2011, when the new Dividend Tax 
                                            
96  Smith Wealth of Nations 426. 
97  Vanistandael "Legal Framework for Taxation" 24-27. 
98  Das Exposition to Economics 336; Frecknall-Hughes Theory, Principles and 
Management of Taxation 25-26. 
99  Vanistandael "Legal Framework for Taxation" 24-27. 
100  Gibson 2017 http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Corporate-
Tax/South-Africa/Cliffe-Dekker-Hofmeyr/BEPS-effect-has-Lord-Tomlins-famous-
dictum-become-
obsolete?utm_source=ILO+Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Newslet
ter+2017-10-20&utm_campaign=Corporate+Tax+Newsletter. 
101  Vanistandael "Legal Framework for Taxation" 27. 
102  Jain et al Macro Economics 398; Jain Public Finance and International Trade 40. 
103  Jurinsky Tax Reform 15. 
104  Backhaus and Wagner Handbook of Public Finance 195. 
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dispensation replaced the STC rules. No similar provision existed for many 
years under the Dividend Tax dispensation. Thus, it is clear that section 
44(9A) was promulgated with retroactive effect purely to target specific 
legitimate transactions in order to collect lost taxes.  
Generally, and unless the contrary appears by express or necessary 
implication, legislation and amendments to legislation apply with 
prospective effect only.105 In the Curtis case Innes CJ ruled that legislation 
applies prospectively specifically so that vested rights are not taken away.106 
In Kruger v President Insurance Co Ltd107 it was held that a court is more 
likely to rule in favour of retroactivity where vested rights are not affected 
negatively by the retrospective operation, or where the purpose of the 
legislation is to grant a benefit or to ensure equity in the operation of law. In 
casu, apart from granting the commissioner the ability to tax very specific 
transactions, it cannot be said that the retroactivity of section 44(9A) 
ensures equity in the operation of law. Importantly, the retroactivity 
negatively affects Pienaar's vested rights. Having regard to the judgment in 
Curtis, where a vested right is negatively affected, an amendment cannot 
apply retrospectively. This is irrespective of the retroactivity that applies by 
express provision or by implication. However, in Burt v Shield Insurance Co 
Ltd108 Watermeyer J ruled that the presumption against removing accrued 
or vested rights must yield to clear and unambiguous language of 
enactment.109 This is so, even where the consequence of the retrospectivity 
appears to be unjust.110 Even so, transactions which have been completed 
before the enactment belong to the past and cannot be affected by the 
retroactivity of the legislation.111 In casu the transactions were completed 
before the promulgation of the amendment which enacted section 44(9A) 
                                            
105  Transnet Ltd v Ngcezula 1995 3 SA 538 (A); S v Venter (CCT109/10) 2011 ZACC 
22 (14 June 2011); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus 2000 1 SA 
1127 (SCA); Bareki v Gencor Ltd 2006 1 SA 432 (T); S v Koukoulas 1970 2 SA 477 
(T); Curtis v Johannesburg Municipality 1906 TS 308 (hereafter the Curtis case) 
106  Curtis case 311. Also see Transvaal Investment Co v Springs Municipality 1922 AD 
337; Shaboodien v Sekretrais van Binnelandse Sake 1971 3 SA 684 (C). 
107  Kruger v President Insurance Co Ltd 1994 2 SA 495 (D). 
108  Burt v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1975 4 SA 133 (A). 
109  Also see Soja (Pty) Ltd v Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1981 
3 SA 314 (AD); Caterers & Entertainers Ltd v City of Salisbury 1974 4 SA 515 (R). 
110  See R v Ah Koon 1927 TPD 966; Browne v Incorporated Law Society of Natal 1968 
3 SA 535 (N). 
111  Du Plessis v Raubenheimer 1917 OPD 104; Bell v Voorsitter van die 
Rasseklassifikasieraad 1968 2 SA 678 (A); Thom v Moulder 1974 4 SA 894 (A); 
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took effect. Importantly, section 12(2)(c) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 
specifically provides that where a law repeals another law, then unless the 
contrary intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, 
obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so 
repealed. In Cape Town Municipality v Bethnal Investments (Pty) Ltd112 
Watermeyer J ruled that the presumption against interference with vested 
rights is not limited to property rights or rights in terms of contract, but that 
it extends to rights acquired in terms of a statute. This, in a constitutional 
state, includes rights vested in terms of the Constitution. It can further be 
argued that rights vested in statute include a taxpayer's tax position that he 
acquired as a result of the application of tax statutes that existed when he 
entered into certain transactions. The taxpayer's right to tax certainty and 
his right to manage his affairs to ensure the best tax or commercial 
advantage are negatively affected by the retroactivity of the amendment 
which inserted section 44(9A). In addition, the retroactivity of section 44(9A) 
infringes on the taxpayer's constitutional right to property. Section 25 of the 
Constitution provides that: 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application  
(a) for public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and 
manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those 
affected or decided or approved by a court. 
It is well known that the Income Tax Act is law of general application. The 
deprivation of property which is a consequence of the liability to pay taxes, 
albeit involuntary, is not unconstitutional.113 Freedom from tax is not a 
fundamental right.114 While the imposition of taxes is acceptable in an open 
and democratic society, they must be imposed subject to the safeguards 
contained in the Bill of Rights.115 Thus, an amendment that applies 
retrospectively may not arbitrarily deprive the taxpayer of property. Croome 
notes that the retrospective application of amendments to tax legislation – 
which impose a tax liability – constitutes a confiscation of property held by 
the taxpayer.116 The retroactivity of an amendment to tax legislation is 
justifiable in cases where it corrects or evens out past prejudice towards the 
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113  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Westbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Services 2001 3 SA 310 (C); First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Westbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Services 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
114  Also see Krok v Commissioner, South African Revenue Services 2015 6 SA 317 
(SCA). 
115  Croome Taxpayer's Rights 20. 
116  Croome Taxpayer's Rights 63. 
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taxpayer, confers benefits to the taxpayer, or corrects errors in previous 
versions of legislation.117 Croome believes that it would be difficult to show 
that tax legislation with retroactive effect is arbitrary where it applies to 
taxpayers in general.118 This is especially so in the light of the limitations 
clause in section 36 of the Constitution. Given the limited scope of section 
44(9A) it cannot be said that it applies to taxpayers in general. Instead, it 
applies to specific transactions and a specific class of taxpayers only. Can 
it be said then that the retroactivity of section 44(9A) deprives the specific 
class of taxpayers from property arbitrarily?  
The word “arbitrary” originates in the Latin arbitrārius, which refers to 
something that is uncertain. In modern English, an arbitrary rule or action is 
founded on or subject to personal whims, prejudices or, in the case of a 
penalty or punishment, not laid down by statute or within the court's 
discretion.119 Accordingly, where an amendment to legislation is envisaged 
that would impact negatively on a taxpayer's right to tax certainty and the 
constitutional right to property, the taxpayer must be afforded an opportunity 
to arrange his affairs before the promulgation of such an amendment so as 
not to be deprived of his rights arbitrarily. Pienaar therefore correctly argued 
that "unless there was adequate warning of the intention to implement the 
change retrospectively, such that the taxpayer cannot be said to have been 
entitled to rely on the law continuing to apply, a retroactive amendment 
could never120 pass constitutional muster."121 In addition, the warning must 
relate to the actual amendment. It does not serve as a warning where a 
politician or the commissioner makes statements in the media hinting at 
possible amendments and where the final amendment differs essentially 
from the media statement or parliamentary discussions or announcements. 
Similarly, where an amendment in a draft bill differs essentially from the final 
version it cannot be said that the taxpayer was adequately warned. Instead, 
such uncertainty constitutes an arbitrary amendment - especially where the 
amendment applies with retrospective effect. As section 44(9A) applies to a 
limited number of transactions and to a specific group of taxpayers only, the 
argument that the retrospective effect of the amendment serves a public 
purpose or that it is in the public interest is flawed. This is so, because the 
transaction entered into by Pienaar was for reasons of business efficacy, 
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especially to introduce a BEE business partner. Fabricius J ruled that there 
is no authority or legislative provision that provides that a fairly precise 
warning needs to be given before the legislature can pass retrospective 
legislation.122 While this is so, the retrospective effect of legislation or 
amendments to legislation must still be subject to the safeguards in the Bill 
of Rights. Fabricius J further ruled that if the tax statute is rationally 
connected to a legitimate purpose, no precise warning is required, if one at 
all.123 As we have pointed out above, the rationality of the retroactivity of 
section 44(9A) or the legitimate purpose thereof is questionable. The fact 
that a loophole in the Act may result in a flood of amalgamation transactions 
that would ultimately be to the detriment of the fiscus does not rationalise a 
retroactive amendment where such an amendment is promulgated without 
adequate warning. Surely, where a loophole is exploited to obtain a tax 
benefit, the transaction must in principle be set-aside in terms of section 
80A-L. Accordingly, when he became aware of the loophole the 
commissioner was not entirely without remedy. The fact that reliance on the 
GAAR may not have been successful is irrelevant. Therefore, the argument 
that a prospective amendment would have encouraged taxpayers to exploit 
the loophole in the last few months before the loophole was closed cannot 
stand. While there might be room for avoidance action between the 
announcement of the amendment and the promulgation, the avoidance 
transactions must, in our view, be captured by a GAAR or specific anti-
avoidance provisions which are clear and certain, and which applied at the 
time of the transaction. In the current case, Pienaar did not show the 
intention to obtain a tax benefit. The transaction was bona fide entered into 
for the purposes of business efficacy. As a result, it cannot be said that 
Pienaar exploited the loophole. As the commissioner was not entirely 
without remedy, the retroactivity without precise warning constitutes an 
arbitrary deprivation of the taxpayer's property. More importantly, the 
significant differences in the announcement by the minister, the draft bill, 
and the final amendment negatively affected the taxpayer's right to certainty.  
9 Conclusion 
It is a pity that the court did not have the opportunity to consider the merits 
of the matter and that it found that section 44(9A) did apply in casu. The 
argument of Pienaar that the commissioner would not have been able to 
levy STC, were it not for the application of the retrospective amendment of 
section 44(9A), is valid in our view. Without this amendment, and upon a 
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consideration of the merits, CGT liability would be deferred until a later stage 
while the calculation of certain values would have had to be done at the time 
of the distribution of the amount out of the share premium account. This 
would amount to the same treatment as applied to all other returns of capital 
to shareholders at the time. This falls squarely within the parameters of the 
law as it applied at the time of the transaction. The sole intention of the 
transactions was of a commercial nature. No avoidance intention was 
evident, which means that the requirements of the GAAR could not be 
fulfilled. It seems that the taxpayer in this case exercised his right to arrange 
his affairs in the most effective manner in accordance with the law as it 
applied at the time, a principle which is well established in tax jurisprudence. 
This did not leave the fiscus without a remedy, as the value of this 
distribution would be taken into account upon the disposal of the shares for 
CGT or income tax purposes depending on the situation of the shareholders 
who disposed of the shares. Accordingly, it cannot be said that there would 
be base erosion or a loss of tax revenue.  
The part of the judgment that deals with the retroactivity of the amendment 
is unsatisfactory. The court did not consider the taxpayer's right to property 
with reference to the right to tax certainty. In addition, the court failed to 
consider that the commissioner is not entirely without remedy where a 
loophole in tax legislation exists. As a result, the conclusion that the 
retroactivity of the amendment is rational, and as a result of this rationality, 
constitutional, is incorrect. The fact remains that retroactivity cannot affect 
vested rights, specifically rights vested in completed transactions. 
Moreover, amendments to tax legislation cannot be applied retrospectively 
to collect lost taxes. In the case of completed transactions, the 
commissioner must stand or fall by the provisions of the act as they applied 
when the taxpayer entered into the transactions. An amendment intended 
to close a loophole must be accompanied by a warning to taxpayers that is 
relatively certain. Media statements by the minister of finance of proposed 
amendments that may apply with retrospective effect do not constitute a 
warning that creates tax certainty. While retroactivity may prevent a scurry 
of avoidance transactions entered into before the amendment takes effect, 
the retroactivity may apply without warning only in cases where the 
commissioner is otherwise without remedy. This, in our view, is the only just, 
legitimate, and constitutional circumstance under which retroactive 
amendments that affect the vested rights of a taxpayer negatively (in the 
case of completed contracts) may be implemented.  
LG TREDOUX & SP VAN ZYL PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  27 
We have it on good authority that leave for appeal was granted. We can 
only hope that the Supreme Court of Appeal will interpret and apply the law 
correctly and that the values of the Constitution will be upheld.  
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